Jun ZhangPh.D in Economics (2017), California Institute of Technology
Associate Professor of Economics, Institute for Social and Economic Research, Nanjing Audit University Research Fields: Microeconomics, Market Design, Behavioral EconomicsCurriculum Vitae (November 2019) ORCID
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Working Papers
11. Coalition and core in resource allocation and exchange [PDF], 2020
10. Job rotation: core and mechanism [PDF], with Jingsheng Yu, 2020
9. Size dominance in the assignment problem, 2019
8. On substitutes and stability for many-to-many matching with contracts [PDF], with Keisuke Bando and Toshiyuki Hirai, 2019
7. Truncation-invariant allocation [PDF], revised 2020
6. Fractional Top Trading Cycle on the full preference domain [PDF], with Jingsheng Yu, 2020
5. Fractional Top Trading Cycle [PDF], with Jingsheng Yu, revised 2020
4. Constrained Pseudo-market Equilibrium, with Federico Echenique and Antonio Miralles, 2019
3. Fairness and efficiency for probabilistic allocations with participation constraints [PDF], with Federico Echenique and Antonio Miralles, revised 2020
2. Level-k reasoning in school choice [PDF], 2017
1. Sequential Luce with categorization [PDF], 2017
10. Job rotation: core and mechanism [PDF], with Jingsheng Yu, 2020
9. Size dominance in the assignment problem, 2019
8. On substitutes and stability for many-to-many matching with contracts [PDF], with Keisuke Bando and Toshiyuki Hirai, 2019
7. Truncation-invariant allocation [PDF], revised 2020
6. Fractional Top Trading Cycle on the full preference domain [PDF], with Jingsheng Yu, 2020
5. Fractional Top Trading Cycle [PDF], with Jingsheng Yu, revised 2020
4. Constrained Pseudo-market Equilibrium, with Federico Echenique and Antonio Miralles, 2019
3. Fairness and efficiency for probabilistic allocations with participation constraints [PDF], with Federico Echenique and Antonio Miralles, revised 2020
2. Level-k reasoning in school choice [PDF], 2017
1. Sequential Luce with categorization [PDF], 2017
Publications
4. A market design approach to job rotation [PDF], with Jingsheng Yu, Games and Economic Behavior, 2020 March
3. When are efficient and fair assignment mechanisms group strategy-proof? [PDF], Games and Economic Behavior, 2020 January
2. Efficient and fair assignment mechanisms are strongly group manipulable [PDF, online appendix], Journal of Economic Theory, 2019 March
1. On sufficient conditions for the existence of stable matchings with contracts [PDF], Economics Letters, 2016 August,
3. When are efficient and fair assignment mechanisms group strategy-proof? [PDF], Games and Economic Behavior, 2020 January
2. Efficient and fair assignment mechanisms are strongly group manipulable [PDF, online appendix], Journal of Economic Theory, 2019 March
1. On sufficient conditions for the existence of stable matchings with contracts [PDF], Economics Letters, 2016 August,
