Jun ZhangPh.D in Economics (2017), California Institute of Technology Associate Professor of Economics, Institute for Social and Economic Research, Nanjing Audit University Research FieldsMicroeconomics, Market Design, Behavioral Economics
Curriculum Vitae |
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Working Papers
10. Size dominance in the assignment problem, 2019
9. A market design approach to job rotation [PDF], with Jingsheng Yu, 2019, accepted at Games and Economic Behavior
8. On substitutes and stability for many-to-many matching with contracts [PDF], with Keisuke Bando and Toshiyuki Hirai, 2019
7. On truncation-invariant allocation mechanism, revised 2019
6. Fractional Top Trading Cycle on the full preference domain, with Jingsheng Yu, in preparation, 2018
5. Fractional Top Trading Cycle, with Jingsheng Yu, revised 2019
4. Constrained Pseudo-market Equilibrium, with Federico Echenique and Antonio Miralles, 2019
3. Fairness and efficiency for probabilistic allocations with endowments, with Federico Echenique and Antonio Miralles, revised 2019
2. Level-k reasoning in school choice [PDF], 2017
1. Sequential Luce with categorization [PDF], 2017
9. A market design approach to job rotation [PDF], with Jingsheng Yu, 2019, accepted at Games and Economic Behavior
8. On substitutes and stability for many-to-many matching with contracts [PDF], with Keisuke Bando and Toshiyuki Hirai, 2019
7. On truncation-invariant allocation mechanism, revised 2019
6. Fractional Top Trading Cycle on the full preference domain, with Jingsheng Yu, in preparation, 2018
5. Fractional Top Trading Cycle, with Jingsheng Yu, revised 2019
4. Constrained Pseudo-market Equilibrium, with Federico Echenique and Antonio Miralles, 2019
3. Fairness and efficiency for probabilistic allocations with endowments, with Federico Echenique and Antonio Miralles, revised 2019
2. Level-k reasoning in school choice [PDF], 2017
1. Sequential Luce with categorization [PDF], 2017
Publications
3. When are efficient and fair assignment mechanisms group strategy-proof? [PDF], Games and Economic Behavior, 2020 January
2. Efficient and fair assignment mechanisms are strongly group manipulable [PDF, online appendix, codes], Journal of Economic Theory, 2019 March
1. On sufficient conditions for the existence of stable matchings with contracts [PDF], Economics Letters, 2016 August,
2. Efficient and fair assignment mechanisms are strongly group manipulable [PDF, online appendix, codes], Journal of Economic Theory, 2019 March
1. On sufficient conditions for the existence of stable matchings with contracts [PDF], Economics Letters, 2016 August,
