Jun ZhangPh.D in Economics (2017), California Institute of Technology
Associate Professor of Economics, Institute for Social and Economic Research, Nanjing Audit University Research Fields: Microeconomics, Market Design, Behavioral EconomicsCurriculum Vitae (2021 April) ORCID
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Publications
8. Constrained Pseudo-market Equilibrium, with Federico Echenique and Antonio Miralles, 2021
American Economic Review, forthcoming
7. On substitutes and stability for many-to-many matching with contracts [PDF, Publisher] with Keisuke Bando and Toshiyuki Hirai
Games and Economic Behavior, 2021 September
6. Fairness and efficiency for allocations with participation constraints [PDF, Publisher], with Federico Echenique and Antonio Miralles
Journal of Economic Theory, 2021 July
5. Level-k reasoning in school choice [PDF, Publisher]
Games and Economic Behavior, 2021 July
4. A market design approach to job rotation [PDF, Publisher], with Jingsheng Yu
Games and Economic Behavior, 2020 March
3. When are efficient and fair assignment mechanisms group strategy-proof? [PDF, Publisher]
Games and Economic Behavior, 2020 January
2. Efficient and fair assignment mechanisms are strongly group manipulable [PDF, Publisher, online appendix],
Journal of Economic Theory, 2019 March
1. On sufficient conditions for the existence of stable matchings with contracts [PDF, Publisher]
Economics Letters, 2016 August
American Economic Review, forthcoming
7. On substitutes and stability for many-to-many matching with contracts [PDF, Publisher] with Keisuke Bando and Toshiyuki Hirai
Games and Economic Behavior, 2021 September
6. Fairness and efficiency for allocations with participation constraints [PDF, Publisher], with Federico Echenique and Antonio Miralles
Journal of Economic Theory, 2021 July
5. Level-k reasoning in school choice [PDF, Publisher]
Games and Economic Behavior, 2021 July
4. A market design approach to job rotation [PDF, Publisher], with Jingsheng Yu
Games and Economic Behavior, 2020 March
3. When are efficient and fair assignment mechanisms group strategy-proof? [PDF, Publisher]
Games and Economic Behavior, 2020 January
2. Efficient and fair assignment mechanisms are strongly group manipulable [PDF, Publisher, online appendix],
Journal of Economic Theory, 2019 March
1. On sufficient conditions for the existence of stable matchings with contracts [PDF, Publisher]
Economics Letters, 2016 August
Working papers
8. Cores in discrete exchange economies with complex endowments [PDF], revised 2021
R&R Journal of Economic Theory
7. The core in the housing market model with indifferent preferences [PDF], 2021
6. The core in the housing market model with fractional endowments [PDF], with Jingsheng Yu, 2021
5. Job rotation: core and mechanism [PDF], with Jingsheng Yu, 2020
4. Strategy-proof allocation with outside option [PDF], revised 2020
3. Fractional Top Trading Cycle on the full preference domain [PDF], with Jingsheng Yu, 2020
2. Efficient and fair trading algorithms in market design environments [PDF], with Jingsheng Yu, revised 2021
-- Previous title: Fractional Top Trading Cycle
1. Sequential Luce with categorization [PDF], 2017
R&R Journal of Economic Theory
7. The core in the housing market model with indifferent preferences [PDF], 2021
6. The core in the housing market model with fractional endowments [PDF], with Jingsheng Yu, 2021
5. Job rotation: core and mechanism [PDF], with Jingsheng Yu, 2020
4. Strategy-proof allocation with outside option [PDF], revised 2020
3. Fractional Top Trading Cycle on the full preference domain [PDF], with Jingsheng Yu, 2020
2. Efficient and fair trading algorithms in market design environments [PDF], with Jingsheng Yu, revised 2021
-- Previous title: Fractional Top Trading Cycle
1. Sequential Luce with categorization [PDF], 2017
Short notes
1. A note on Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2011 AER) [PDF]
-- Show that the proposition in their online appendix is incorrect.
-- Show that the proposition in their online appendix is incorrect.
