Jun ZhangPh.D in Economics (2017), California Institute of Technology Assistant Professor of Economics, Nanjing Audit University Research FieldsMicroeconomics, Market Design, Behavioral Economics
Curriculum Vitae |
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Working Papers
11. Size dominance in the assignment problem, 2019
10. When are efficient and fair assignment mechanisms group strategy-proof? 2019, R&R at Games and Economic Behavior
9. A market design approach to job rotation [PDF], with Jingsheng Yu, 2019, R&R at Games and Economic Behavior
-previous title: A new solvable weak priority structure
8. On truncation-invariant allocation mechanism, 2018
7. Fractional Top Trading Cycle on the full preference domain, with Jingsheng Yu, in preparation, 2018
6. Fractional Top Trading Cycle, with Jingsheng Yu, 2018
5. Fairness and efficiency for probabilistic allocations with endowments, with Federico Echenique and Antonio Miralles, 2018
4. Level-k reasoning in school choice [PDF], 2017
3. A new solution to the random assignment problem with private endowment [PDF], 2017
2. A simple solution to the random assignment problem on the full preference domain [PDF], 2017, R.R at Social Choice and Welfare
1. Sequential Luce with categorization [PDF], 2017
10. When are efficient and fair assignment mechanisms group strategy-proof? 2019, R&R at Games and Economic Behavior
9. A market design approach to job rotation [PDF], with Jingsheng Yu, 2019, R&R at Games and Economic Behavior
-previous title: A new solvable weak priority structure
8. On truncation-invariant allocation mechanism, 2018
7. Fractional Top Trading Cycle on the full preference domain, with Jingsheng Yu, in preparation, 2018
6. Fractional Top Trading Cycle, with Jingsheng Yu, 2018
5. Fairness and efficiency for probabilistic allocations with endowments, with Federico Echenique and Antonio Miralles, 2018
4. Level-k reasoning in school choice [PDF], 2017
3. A new solution to the random assignment problem with private endowment [PDF], 2017
2. A simple solution to the random assignment problem on the full preference domain [PDF], 2017, R.R at Social Choice and Welfare
1. Sequential Luce with categorization [PDF], 2017
Publications
2. Efficient and fair assignment mechanisms are strongly group manipulable [PDF, online appendix, codes], accepted by Journal of Economic Theory, 2018
1. On sufficient conditions for the existence of stable matchings with contracts [PDF], Economics Letters, 2016,
1. On sufficient conditions for the existence of stable matchings with contracts [PDF], Economics Letters, 2016,
